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Abstract: 
This article studies the price relationships between EU emissions allowances (EUAs) – 
valid under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – and secondary Certified 
Emissions Reductions (sCERs) – established from primary CERs generated through the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Given the price differences 
between EUAs and sCERs, financial and industrial operators may benefit from arbitrage 
strategies by buying sCERs and selling EUAs (i.e. selling the EUA-sCER spread) to cover 
their compliance position between these two assets, as industrial operators are allowed to 
use sCERs towards compliance with their emissions cap within the European system up to 
13.4%. Our central results show that the spread is mainly driven by EUA prices and market 
microstructure variables and less importantly, as we would expect, by emissions-related 
fundamental drivers. This might be justified by the fact that the EU ETS remains the 
greatest source of CER demand to date. 
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1.  Introduction 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the EU's flagship climate 
policy forcing industrial polluters to reduce their CO2 emissions in order to help the 
European Member States to achieve their Kyoto Protocol target (i.e. to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions on average by 8% with respect to 1990 levels). As an emissions cap, 
industrial operators receive, in Phases I (2005-2007) and II (2008-2012) of the scheme, a 
yearly allocation of European Union Allowances (EUAs), which represent the right to emit 
one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere.1 The compliance of industrial operators requests the 
balance between verified emissions and allocated allowances. Besides, industrial operators 
may cut the costs of reducing their emissions by using credits issued from the Kyoto 
Protocol Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), called Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs).2 These CERs correspond to one ton of avoided CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, 
and may be obtained through projects development in non Annex-B countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol that allow to reduce emissions compared to a baseline scenario. Once credits have 
been issued by the United Nations’s CDM Executive Board they may be sold by project 
developers on the market, and thus become secondary CERs (sCERs). The central goal of 
this article is to study the price drivers of EUAs and sCERs, and to explain the evolution of 
the price difference observed between these two assets (the EUA-sCER spread). 
Even if both assets allow the emission of one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere, we observe 
the existence of a positive spread between EUA and sCER prices that may be due to the 
partial fungibility between these two carbon assets. Indeed, to provide more flexibility to 
carbon-constrained installations, the European Commission has allowed industries covered 
by the EU ETS to use both assets for compliance. However, it has established a limit on the 
use of CERs (primary or secondary) up to 13.4% of their allocation from 2008 to 2012 on 
average. To comply with their emissions cap, industrial emitters may thus adopt various 
strategies: (i) surrender EUAs (allocated either to the plant or to others plants of the same 
company), (ii) reduce real emissions (either at the installation-level or abroad, using the 
Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms), (iii) buy EUAs or/and sCERs, (iv) borrow EUAs 
from future allocation, (v) surrender banked EUAs from past allocation. Trotignon and 
Leguet (2009) document that, in 2008, 96% of the surrendered allowances were EUAs, and 
only 3.9% were sCERs.3 The trade-offs between using EUAs or sCERs towards compliance 
                                                   
1 For Phase III of the EU ETS starting in 2013, the main part of EUAs will be allocated to industrials though 
auctioning. The power sector will have to buy 100% of its allocation, while sectors faced to international 
competition and some carbon leakages will keep receiving a free yearly allocation. 
2 Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) generated through the Joint Implementation mechanism (JI) of the Kyoto 
Protocol fall beyond the scope of this article, and are left for future research. 
3 Note 0.01% were ERUs. No CERs were used towards compliance before that period, due to the lack of 
connection between the Kyoto Protocol’s International Transaction Log (ITL) and the EU ETS’ 
Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). 
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in the EU ETS depend on the limit of CERs which can be used for compliance, their 
respective price trends, and the price difference between them. Carbon traders and brokers 
are following closely the evolution of the EUA-sCER spread, which reflects the 
uncertainties embedded in the development of both schemes. In theory, as the sCERs are 
free of project delivery risks, the prices of EUAs and sCERs should be equal since they 
represent the same amount of CO2 emissions reduction (one ton). However, due to the limit 
of 13.4% on average of the credits surrendered, the sCERs’ “exchange rate” is smaller than 
for EUAs, and therefore sCERs are discounted with respect to EUAs. This premium 
represents the opportunity cost of using sCERs for compliance instead of EUAs.  
Beyond prices, regulatory issues may also explain the variation of the spread between 
these two carbon assets in the long run. First, with the European Energy Climate package, 
the EU ETS is confirmed until 2020. However, the details concerning the import of CDM 
credits within Phase III (2013-2020) are not known with certainty. Indeed, the European 
Union establishes particular conditions of the emissions trading scheme in Phase III that are 
dependent on the achievement of a post-Kyoto international agreement. Thus, there exists a 
wide range of uncertainties arising around the status and recognition of CERs (both primary 
and secondary) in a revised EU ETS beyond 2012. Second, carbon assets form another 
class of commodities against which traders need to define specific hedging strategies 
(Chevallier (2009), Chevallier et al. (2009)).  
The existence of spreads between assets has been studied mainly on financial markets. 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find that credit spread changes in the U.S. are mainly driven 
by local supply and demand shocks. Manzoni (2002) characterizes the evolution of credit 
spreads on the sterling Eurobond market by a cyclical behavior and persistent volatility 
process. Zhang (2002) examines the predictive power of credit spreads from the corporate 
bond market in the U.S., and supports Bernanke and Gertler’s (1989) credit channel theory 
as the explanation for the strong forecasting ability of credit spreads. Codogno et al. (2003) 
show that differentials between Euro zone government’s bond spreads may be explained by 
banking and corporate risk premiums in the U.S. Ramchander et al. (2005) investigate the 
influence of macroeconomic news on interest rates and yield spreads in the U.S. and they 
find that Consumer Price Index, non-farm payroll figures, and Fed funds rate release 
announcements have a significant influence on changes in these spreads. Gómez-Puig 
(2006) highlights the importance of size and liquidity indicators in explaining sovereign 
yield spreads following the European Monetary Union. Davies (2008) examines U.S. credit 
spread determinants with an 85 year perspective. Based on cointegration techniques for the 
determinants of credit spreads, he demonstrates that key causal relationships exist 
independently across different inflationary environments. Liu and Zhang (2008) investigate 
whether the value spread is a useful predictor of returns. They identify mixed evidence, as 
two related variables, the book-to-market spread (the book-to-market of value stocks minus 
the book-to-market of growth stocks), and the market-to-book spread (the market-to-book 
of growth stocks minus the market-to-book of value stocks) predict returns but with 
The EUA-sCER Spread: Compliance Strategies and Arbitrage  
in the European Carbon Market 
6 
opposite signs. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) further study the spreads between Euro 
area government’s bond yields, and find that they are related to short-term interest rates, 
which are in turn related to liquidity risk components.     
Compared to previous literature, we provide the first empirical analysis of EUA and 
sCERs drivers, and the determinants of the EUA-sCER spread during Phase II (2008-2012) 
of the EU ETS. Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008), and Alberola and 
Chevalier (2009) have already analyzed the price fundamentals of EUAs during Phase I 
(2005-2007) of the EU ETS, but not the drivers of EUAs or sCERs during Phase II. 
Additionally, to our best knowledge, no previous empirical study has focused either on the 
determination of sCERs drivers or on the arbitrage strategies consisting in buying sCERs 
and selling EUAs (yielding net profits from the existence of the positive EUA-sCER 
spread).  
Our central results show that EUAs and sCERs share the same price drivers, i.e. these 
emissions markets prices are mainly determined by institutional events, energy prices, 
weather events, and macroeconomic variables. Moreover, EUAs are found to determine 
significantly the price path of sCERs, by accounting for a large share of the explanatory 
power of sCERs prices. This result emphasizes that EUAs remain the main “money” in the 
field of emissions market, which is exchanged broadly as the most liquid asset for carbon 
trading. The trading of sCERs, while growing exponentially, is still mostly determined by 
the fact that the EU ETS remains the largest emissions trading scheme to date in the world.4 
This result also explains why sCERs are traded at a discounted price from EUAs: absent the 
project risk which is characteristic of primary CERs, sCERs are still limited by the import 
limit set within the EU ETS.  
Regarding the EUA-sCER spread, our central contribution documents that variables 
stemming from the market microstructure literature (such as volumes exchanged on each 
emissions market, see Madhavan (2000) for a review) are the main drivers of the spread, in 
addition to EUA price levels, institutional and macroeconomic variables, and forecast errors 
on the delivery of primary CERs. The latter result may indicate that the EUA-sCER spread 
is traded as a “speculative” product by market participants such as traders and energy 
utilities companies, since it is possible to obtain a net benefit by simultaneously trading 
EUAs and sCERs (when the price difference between these two assets is above a certain 
profitability threshold). Taken together, our results indicate that while the fungibility 
between emissions markets worldwide is quickly developing, there remain significant 
opportunities for price arbitrage. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 details compliance 
strategies in the EU ETS. Section 3 develops a cointegration analysis between EUAs and 
                                                   
4 Note that this situation could change with the future developments from the U.S. federal cap-and-trade 
scheme and other regional initiatives. 
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sCERs prices. Section 4 reviews the main EUAs price drivers. Section 5 covers the specific 
sCERs price drivers. Section 6 focuses on the determinants of the EUA-sCER spread. 
Section 7 summarizes the article with some concluding remarks. 
2.   Compliance Strategies in the EU ETS 
This section briefly reviews background information on the EU ETS, which was 
launched in 2005 according to the Directive 2003/87/EC to facilitate the EU compliance 
with its Kyoto commitments. Phase I was introduced as a training period during 2005-2007. 
Phase II coincides with the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). 
Phase III will cover the period 2013-2020. Around 11,000 energy-intensive installations are 
covered by the scheme, which accounts for nearly 50% of European CO2 emissions 
(Alberola et al., 2009a, 2009b). Emissions caps are determined at the installation-level in 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs). In what follows, we examine more closely EUAs and 
CERs contracts, as well as their respective price developments.  
2.1.  EUAs and CERs contracts  
On the one hand, EUAs are the default carbon asset in the EU emissions trading system. 
They are distributed by European Member States throughout NAPs, and allow industrial 
owners to emit one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere. The supply of EUAs is fixed in NAPs, 
which are known in advance by market participants (2.08 billion per year during 2008-
2012).5  
On the other hand, CERs, which also compensate for tons of CO2 emitted by their 
owners, are much more heterogeneous than EUAs. Primary CERs represent greenhouse 
gases emissions reductions achieved in non-Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol. 
These certificates are issued by the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism 
Executive Board (CDM EB). CDM projects may associate various partners (ETS 
compliance buyers, Kyoto-bound countries, project brokers, profit-driven carbon funds, 
international organizations such as the World Bank, etc.). CDM projects partnerships are 
governed by emissions reduction purchase agreements (ERPAs).6 The price of primary 
CERs will depend on the risk of each project, and on its capacity to effectively issue 
                                                   
5 However on September 23, 2009, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) overruled the decision of the 
European Commission concerning NAPs for the second period submitted by Estonia and Poland. The 
Commission will explore two options: (1) issue a new decision based on “proper” criteria before 
December 23, 2009; and (2) appeal the CFI ruling, on a point of law, before November 23, 2009. Six other 
Eastern European countries may contest NAPs as well. In total, it represents a potential additional 162 
million allowances. 
6 The ERPA basically sets forward the duties and rights of the partners. Among the rights of the partners is the 
right to receive a pro rata quantity of the primary CERs. 
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primary CERs. This price will be the cost of the project divided by the number of primary 
CERs actually issued. Thus, primary CERs from different projects will have different 
prices. 
Once issued by the CDM EB, primary CERs may either be used by industrial firms for 
their own compliance, or sold to other participants in the market. In the latter case, it 
becomes a secondary CER (sCER). Note that as the sCERs are CERs that have been 
already issued by the CDM EB, their project delivery risk is null. As stated in the 
introduction, the main difference between the use of EUAs and CERs (including both, 
primary and secondary) for compliance in the EU ETS lies in the 13.4% (on average) 
import limit set by the European Commission on CERs, while EUAs may be used without 
any limit. The CERs import limit for compliance is equal to 1.4 billion tons of offsets being 
allowed into the EU ETS from 2008-2012.7 
In this article we focus on the price relationships between EUAs and sCERs. Next, we 
describe the EUAs and sCERs price developments. 
2.2.  Price development  
In this section, we examine Phase II EUA and sCER prices, which reflect the price of 
reducing emissions during the commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012).8 The 
sCER price series used for this study is the longest historical price series existing for 
sCERs: the sCER Price Index developed by Reuters. It has been built by rolling over two 
sCERs contracts with different maturity dates (December 2008 and December 2009). 
Similarly, we have rolled over EUA futures contracts traded at the European Climate 
Exchange (ECX) of the corresponding maturity dates (December 2008 and December 
2009) to match them with the sCER price series.9 The sample period considered starts with 
the beginning of the sCER Price Index (March 9, 2007) and ends on March 31, 2009. As 
shown in Figure 1, the EUA and the sCER price series follow a similar price path.  
                                                   
7 In the absence of a satisfactory international agreement, installations subject to allowances during Phase III 
will only be able to use the credits left over from Phase II (2008-2012), or a maximum amount 
corresponding to 11% of the Phase II allocation. These measures are equivalent to capping the potential 
demand for Kyoto credits to 1,510 Mt between 2008 and 2020. If a post-Kyoto international agreement is 
achieved, the ceiling on the use of credits from project mechanisms towards the compliance of EU ETS 
installations will be raised to 50% of the additional reduction efforts. Beyond this issue, the introduction of 
a new international agreement on climate change would introduce “high quality” as a condition for project 
credits coming from countries which have signed the international agreement. This would translate into a 
reduced supply of credits originated from project mechanisms to EU ETS compliance buyers. 
8 Note that banking and borrowing of allowances are allowed within Phases II and III of the EU ETS, contrary 
to Phases I and II (Alberola and Chevallier (2009)).  
9 Carchano and Pardo (2009) analyse the relevance of the choice of the rolling over date using several 
methodologies with stock index future contracts. They conclude that regardless of the criterion applied, 
there are not significant differences between the series obtained. 
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EUAs were traded at €15 in March 2007, then stayed in the range of €19-25 until July 
2008, and decreased steadily afterwards to achieve €8 in February 2009. sCERs started at 
€12.5 in March 2007, evolved in the range of €12-22 through July 2008, and continued to 
track EUA prices until €7 in February 2009. Thus, sCERs have always remained below 
EUAs and consequently the spread has been positive during all the sample period.  
Figure 1: Time-series of ECX EUA Phase II Futures, Reuters CER Price Index, 
and CER-EUA Spread from March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
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Source: Reuters 
Descriptive statistics for EUAs, sCERs, and the spread may be found in Table 1. Given 
the price paths observed in historical data, it appears interesting to investigate the presence 
of one cointegrating relationship between EUAs and sCERs in the next section. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for all dependent variables 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev Skew. Kurt 
Raw Prices series 
EUAt 20.40389 21.52000 29.33000 8.20000 4.459218 -0.765966 3.031938 
sCERt 15.85798 16.6875 22.8500 7.484615 2.986495 -0.351494 3.135252 
Spreadt 4.545912 4.620000 9.043571 0.647857 2.108445 0.047792 2.292397 
Nathural Logarithms 
EUAt 2.986643 3.068983 3.378611 2.104134 0.255164 -1.323179 4.275898 
sCERt 2.743941 2.776476 3.128951 2.012850 0.505511 -0.994736 4.182189 
Log returns 
EUAt -0.000437 0.0001 0.113659 -0.094346 0.026833 -0.060828 4.868026 
sCERt -0.000309 0.0001 0.112545 -0.110409 0.024441 -0.370323 5.961950 
VAR(4) Residuals 
EUAt 0.00001 0.001242 0.108251 -0.094873 0.05903 -0.052333 4.522629 
sCERt 0.00001 0.000390 0.111584 0.097672 0.023742 -0.309379 5.520998 
First-differences 
Δ Spread -0.002219 -0.010179 1.070000 -1.740000 0.295605 -0.368420 6.262861 
 
Note: EUAt refers to ECX EUA Futures, sCERt to Reuters sCER Price Index, and Spreadt = EUAt-sCERt spread. 
Std.Dev. stands for Standard Deviation, Skew. for Skewness, and Kurt. for Kurtosis. The number of observations is 
529. The VAR(4) specification is detailed in Section 2.3. 
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3.   Cointegration Analysis  
Following the methodology used in Manzoni (2002) and Ramchander et al. (2005), who 
studied the relationship between bond spreads, we proceed in a first step by identifying the 
possible cointegration relationship between the two types of assets considered (EUAs and 
sCERs). We will then analyze the EUA-sCER spread drivers. 
3.1.  Unit Roots and Structural Break 
A necessary condition for studying cointegration involves that both time-series are 
integrated of the same order. We thus examine the order of integration, noted d, of the time-
series under consideration based on Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) unit root test. This test 
allows examining the unit root properties of the time-series, while simultaneously detecting 
endogenous structural breaks for each variable. Figure 2 presents the Zivot-Andrews unit 
root test statistics for the two EUA and sCER variables transformed to log-returns.  
Figure 2: Zivot-Andrews (1992) Test Statistic for the EUA (left) and sCER (right) 
Variables 
 
  
 
The model estimated is a combination of a one-time shift in levels, and a change in the 
rate of growth of the series. The null of unit root is clearly rejected in favour of the break-
stationary alternative hypothesis. One estimated break point is identified for each of the 
time-series: February 13, 2009 for the EUA variable, and February 20, 2009 for the sCER 
variable. These breakpoints may be due to a delayed effect of the “credit crunch” crisis on 
the carbon market (see Chevallier (2009) for a discussion). Both time-series are integrated 
of order 1 (I(1)). The existence of a structural break in the time-series considered, while 
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remaining stationary, means that we need to develop cointegration tests that explicitly 
include potential breaks, as they have been developed by Lutkepohl et al. (2004).  
3.2.  VECM and Structural Break 
After having validated the necessary condition for studying cointegration (which 
involves that both time-series should be integrated of the same order), we investigate the 
existence of a long-term relationship across these two carbon prices by employing a 
cointegration analysis with the maximum-likehood test procedure established by Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991). Results for the cointegration test with one 
structural shift at unknown time (Lutkepohl et al (2004)) are shown in Panel A of Table 2. 
The trace statistic result indicates a cointegration space of r = 1, given a 5% significance 
level. We may conclude that there exists one long-term cointegrating vector between the 
EUA and sCER variables taken in natural logarithm form. 
Table 2: Johansen Cointegration Rank Trace Statistic, Cointegration Vector, 
Model Weights and VECM with Structural Break for the EUA and the CER 
Variables. 
Panel A: Johansen Cointegration Rank Trace Statistic 
Hypothesis Statistic 10% 5% 1% 
1≤r  5.26 5.42 6.79 10.04 
r = 1 16.95 13.78 15.83 19.85 
Panel B: Cointegration Vector 
Variable EUA (1) sCER (1) 
EUA (1) 1.0000 1.0000 
sCER (1) -0.4955009 -1.519945 
Panel C: Model Weights 
Variable EUA (1). sCER (1) 
ΔEUA -0.06163548 0.00734759 
ΔsCER -0.04490726 0.0182197 
Panel D: VECM with Structural Break (r = 1) 
Variable ΔEUA ΔsCER 
Error Correction Term (ect) -0.0197908 -0.0282009 
Deterministic constant 0.0106349 0.0154190 
Lagged differences 
ΔEUA (1) -0.0641515 -0.0504123 
ΔsCER (1) 0.2307197 0.1423340 
 
Note: EUA refers to ECX EUA Phase II Futures, sCER to Reuters sCER Price Index, transformed to natural 
logarithms. Critical values are reported in Lutkepohl et al (2004). Lag order in parenthesis. The number of 
observations is 529. 
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Next, we proceed to the estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), 
which is useful in making causal inferences among the variables of our system.10 As shown 
in Panel D of Table 2, the coefficients of the error correction terms for the EUA and sCER 
variables are negative, and thus we validate the error correction specification. In terms of 
short-run dynamics, the error correction terms emerge as important channels of influence in 
mediating the relationship between the different EUAs and sCERs prices. We notice in 
Panel D of Table 2 that the error correction term appears stronger for sCERs than for 
EUAs. This implies that the sCER variable has a stronger behavior to adjust to past 
disequilibria by moving towards the trend values of the EUA variable. This specification 
confirms that EUAs constitute a leading factor in the price formation of sCERs. It can also 
be seen that changes in the respective prices of EUAs and sCERs have a significant causal 
influence (in the Granger sense) on each other.11 
3.3.  VAR(p) Modeling 
In light of the previous results, and in order to proceed with the suitable identification 
of the price drivers for each variable, we use a VAR(p) in differences with an intervention 
dummy for February 2009 to model the data-generating process of the EUA and sCER log-
series. The VAR(p) model is specified as follows: 
ε+Δ++Δ+Δ+=Δ −−− ptpttt yAyAyAAy ...22110  
Where ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ=Δ
t
t
t sCER
EUA
y  is a vector of EUA and sCER log-returns, ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
20
10
0 b
b
A  is a vector 
of constants, and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
22
12
21
11
1 γ
γ
γ
γ
A , etc. are the coefficient matrices. 
To determine the appropriate lag structure, we computed the following information 
criteria: Akaike (AIC(n)=4), Schwarz (SC(n)=1), Hannan-Quinn (HQ(n)=1), and Final 
Prediction Error (FPE(n)=4). Since the Ljung-Box-Pierce Portmanteau test on the residuals 
                                                   
10 The VECM is specified as follows: 
  ε+Δ++=Δ −− 12110 ttt yAEcmAAy  
 Where ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ=Δ
t
t
t sCER
EUA
y  is a vector of first differences of EUA and sCER prices, ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
20
10
0 b
b
A  is a vector 
of constants, ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
21
11
1 b
b
A  is a vector measuring the speed of the adjustment to the long-run relationship, 
and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
22
12
21
11
2 γ
γ
γ
γ
A  is a coefficient matrix. 
11 These results are not reproduced in the article to conserve space, and may be obtained upon request. 
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of the VAR(1) model indicated the presence of autocorrelation, we choose to retain a lag of 
order p = 4. As shown in Table 3, residuals are not auto-correlated for the VAR (4) model.  
Table 3: Diagnostic test of VAR(4) Model 
 Test Statistic D. F. p-value 
Portmanteau 57.4878 48 0.16 
ARCH VAR 97.1946 9 0.01 
JB VAR 147.6817 4 0.01 
Kurtosis 143.5005 2 0.01 
Skewness 4.1811 2 0.12 
 
Note: Portmanteau is the asymptotic Portmanteau test with a maximum lag of 16, ARCH VAR is the 
multivariate ARCH test with a maximum lag of order 5, JB is the Jarque Bera Normality test for multivariate series 
applied to the residuals of the VAR(4). Kurtosis and Skweness stand for separate tests for multivariate skewness and 
kurtosis. D.F. stands for degree of freedom of the test statistic. 
The ARCH effect is very strong, which indicates the necessity to use a GARCH model 
for further analysis. Figure 3 plots the log-returns and the VAR(4) residuals of the ECX 
EUA Phase II Futures and sCER Price Index time price series.  
 
Figure 3: Log-returns (left) and VAR(4) residuals (right) of ECX EUA Phase II 
Futures and Reuters sCER Price index for the sample period from March 9, 2007 to 
March 31, 2009 
 
Figure 4 shows the OLS-based CUSUM tests for the VAR (4) residuals. Despite some 
structural instability around the February 2009 breakpoints, the residuals stay within the 
interval confidence levels. 
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Figure 4: OLS-CUSUM Test for the EUA (left) and sCER (right) Variables of the 
VAR(4) Model 
  
Additional impulse response analysis reveals the traditional “hump” shape between 
EUAs and sCERs, as shocks pass on both variables and fluctuations dampen at the horizon 
of 10 lags.12 The variance decomposition indicates that the variance of the forecast error for 
the EUA price is due to its own innovations up to 90%. For the sCER price, the variance of 
the forecast error is due to EUAs up to 70%, and only 30% to its own innovations. These 
results confirm our findings in Section 2.2.  
In the next step of our empirical analysis, we proceed by fitting a suitable GARCH 
model to the residuals of the VAR (4) model for the EUA and sCER variables. 
4.   EUAs Price Drivers 
In this section, we focus on the drivers of EUAs using the residuals of the VAR(4) 
model. As detailed in previous literature, we may distinguish between factors determining 
the supply and demand of EUAs. The supply of EUAs is fixed by the European 
Commission in National Allocation Plans that are validated after negotiation between 
Member States and national industrials covered by the scheme. Announcements relative to 
the strictness of NAPs have been shown to have a strong influence on EUA prices 
(Alberola et al. (2008), Chevallier et al. (2009), Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2009)). 
Concerning demand factors, previous literature identifies energy prices, weather events, and 
the level of industrial production as being the main drivers of EUAs during Phase I 
(Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2009a, 2009b).  
                                                   
12  These results are not reproduced here to conserve space, and may be obtained upon request. 
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4.1.  Database 
We include as EUAs price drivers the most representative energy prices in Europe. That 
is, the daily Brent and natural gas futures prices traded at the International Petroleum 
Exchange (IPL) and coal prices CIF ARA.13 The time-series have been built by rolling over 
the nearest month ahead contract. As the futures contract on Brent is quoted in US$ per 
barrel, the futures contract on Natural Gas is quoted in GBP per therm, and the coal 
contract is quoted in US$ per metric ton, we have converted all price series to Euro by 
using the daily exchange rate data available from the European Central Bank.14 Figure 5 
shows these energy prices. 
Figure 5: IPE Crude Oil Brent, IPE Natural Gas, and Coal CIF ARA Prices from 
March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
 
Source: Reuters 
                                                   
13 CIF ARA defines the price of coal inclusive of freight and insurance delivered to the large North West 
European ports, e.g. Amsterdam, Rotterdam or Antwerp. 
14 Data available at http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html 
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Besides, we use the CO2 switch price between coal and gas in €/ton, as computed in the 
Tendances Carbone database.15 This variable represents the fictional daily price that 
establishes the equilibrium between the Clean Dark Spread and the Clean Spark Spread.16 
It therefore represents the price of CO2 above which it becomes profitable in the short term 
for an electric power producer to switch from coal to natural gas. The economic logic 
behind the use of these spreads lies in the central role played by power producers in the 
determination of the EUA price, since they receive around half of the allowances 
distributed in the EU emissions trading system (Delarue et al. (2008), Ellerman and 
Feilhauer (2008)). The CO2 switch price, Clean Dark and Clean Spark Spreads are 
displayed in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Clean Dark Spread, Clean Spark Spread, and Switch Price from March 
9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
  
 
Source: Reuters 
                                                   
15 Tendances carbone is a monthly newsletter on the EU ETS, produced by the Caisse des Dépôts, Mission 
Climat the research team of CDC Climat department which is in charge of finance carbon activities. It can 
be found at http://www.caissedesdepots.fr/missionclimat 
16  Note that the Clean Dark Spread represents the difference between the price of electricity at peak hours 
and the price of coal used to generate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the coal plant. The 
Clean Spark Spread represents the difference between the price of electricity at peak hours and the price 
of natural gas used to generate that electricity, corrected for the energy output of the gas-fired plant. Both 
spreads are expressed in €/MWh. 
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To take into account weather influences, we use the Tendances Carbone European 
temperatures index, which is an average of national temperatures indices of four European 
countries (France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom), weighted by the share of 
each National Allocation Plan. From this index, we have created three new variables: 
tempec represents the difference between the value of the temperatures index and the 
decennial average; temphot is a dummy variable for extremely hot temperatures (equal to 1 
if the value of the temperatures index is higher than the third quartile of the series, and 0 
otherwise); and tempcold is a dummy variable for extremely cold temperatures (equal to 1 
if the value of the temperatures index is lower than the first quartile of the series; and 0 
otherwise). The temperatures index and its deviation from decennial average are shown in 
Figure 7. 
Figure 7: European Temperatures Index and Deviation from Decennial Average 
from March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
Source: Mission Climat Caisse des Dépôts 
We have also introduced exogenous variables impacting CO2 emissions levels. First, we 
consider the Tendances Carbone European Industrial Production index indicator, which 
uses Eurostat production indices and is a backward-looking indicator tracking past 
economic trends. Second, we use the Economic Sentiment Index published by Eurostat, 
which reflects overall perceptions and expectations at the individual sector level in a single 
aggregate index. This index is a forward-looking indicator used to mirror economic sectors’ 
sentiment. Finally, the “credit crunch” crisis may also have an impact on CO2 emissions 
levels. To detect this potential influence, we have created the variable crisis as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 from August, 17 2007 onwards and 0 otherwise. This date corresponds 
to the first cut in interests rates by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and may be considered as the 
beginning of the financial crisis (Chevallier (2009)). Figure 8 shows the European 
Industrial Production Index and the European Sentiment Index variables. 
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Figure 8: Tendances Carbone Industrial Production Index (Weighted by the Share 
of NAPs) and EU Economic Sentiment Index 
  
Source: Mission Climat - Caisse des Dépôts, Eurostat. 
 
Additionally, we consider three other variables relevant to market trends. First, to take 
into account the slope of the Euro area yield curve, we have used the yield variable, which 
is available from the European Central Bank.17 This series is built as the spread between the 
5- and the 2-year interest rates. A positive (negative) value of the variable yield is expected 
to indicate an upward-sloping (downward-sloping) interest rate term structure, and hence a 
trend to cool down (stimulate) the economy (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)). Second, we 
have computed the momentumEUA variable. This variable represents the difference between 
ECX EUA Phase II Futures prices at time t and at time t-5, thereby indicating bullish or 
bearish carbon market trends. Finally, VIX is the volatility index published by the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE), which is widely recognized as an indicator of aggregate 
market volatility among financial practitioners (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)). Figure 9 
presents the evolution of the three variables.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
17 Data can be found at : http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu 
18 Note we leave for further research the investigation of other potential explanatory variables, such as EUA 
forward curves and the return on investment for EUAs growing at the EURIBOR rate.  
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Figure 9: Slope of Yield Curve, Market Momentum, and VIX Index from March 
9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
MOMENTUMEUA 
 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Reuters and CBOE 
Regarding news variables that may impact the supply of EUAs, we consider three types 
of events. First we take into account the arrival of new information concerning Phase II 
NAPs. Second, we consider news related to the extended development of the EU ETS 
during Phase III. These two dummy variables have been constructed by filtering the most 
reliable and significant announcements on EU ETS developments from the European 
Commission website.19 Third, we also take into account the likely impact on EUA prices 
provoked by the connection between the Kyoto Protocol’s International Transaction Log 
(ITL) and the EU ETS’ Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) on October 10, 
2008 throughout the ITL-CITL dummy variable. This variable takes the value of 1 when 
news concerning the connection occurred and 0 otherwise. 
After transforming, when necessary, the exogenous variables of our database into 
stationary variables, we detail in the next section the GARCH modelling for the EUA 
variable. 
                                                   
19 Those announcements are presented in Annex 1. They have been obtained from the European Commission 
website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment 
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4.2.  GARCH Modeling 
We model the EUA variable by using the asymmetric TGARCH (p,q) model by 
Zakoian (1994) with a Student’s t innovation distribution, estimated by Quasi Maximum 
Likelihood with the BHHH algorithm: 
tttt
tttEUAttt
tttttttt
CITLITLNAPphaseIIIIIEUETSphase
VIXcrisismomentumyieldEUESIMCprod
tempcoldtemphottempecswitchgascoalbrentEUA
ενθμ
ϑλκιϖη
γϕφξδχρα
++++
++++++
+++++++=
_
( ) ( ) ( ) 1110 −−−−+−+ +−+= tttt LLL σβεαεαασ  
with EUAt the residuals of the VAR(4) model related to the EUA at time t, α the 
constant, brentt, coalt, and gast are the returns of the brent, coal and gas series, switcht the 
switch variable, tempect, temphott, tempcoldt the temperatures variables, MCprodt the 
industrial production index from Tendances Carbone, EUESIt the EU Economic Sentiment 
Index, yieldt the slope of the Euro area yield curve, momentumEUAt the momentum variable 
concerning the EUA market, crisist the dummy variable accounting for the “credit crunch”, 
VIXt the CBOE volatility indicator, EUETSphaseIIIt the dummy variable for Phase III news, 
NAPphaseIIt the dummy variable for Phase II news, ITL_CITLt the dummy variable for the 
ITL-CITL connection, tε  the error term, tσ  the conditional volatility, the subscript index t 
refers to date t. ( ) +−1tL ε  and ( ) −−1tL ε  are the positive and negative errors of the mean equation 
lagged one period respectively, and ( ) 1−tL σ  is the conditional volatility lagged one period. 
Note that in this model ( ) +−1tL ε  and ( ) −−1tL ε  capture asymmetric effects. 
4.3.  Estimation results 
By estimating the TGARCH model presented in Section 3.2 and removing one by one 
non-significant exogenous variables, we are able to identify two different sets of regression 
results. In Table 4, regression (1) includes the main energy variables, while regression (2) 
contains the switch and other market variables. The quality of the regressions is verified 
following several diagnostic tests: the Adjusted R2, the Log-Likelihood ratio, the ARCH 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, the Ljung-Box Q-test statistic with a maximum number of 
lags of 20 (Q(20) statistic), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz 
Criterion (SC). For both models, the Ljung-Box-Pierce test indicates that residuals are not 
autocorrelated, and the Engle ARCH test indicates that heteroskedasticity is adequately 
captured by the structure of the TGARCH model. Besides, we have investigated the 
presence of multicolinearity by computing the matrix of partial cross-correlations and the 
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inflation of variance between explanatory variables.20 These calculations did not reveal 
serious problematic multicolinearities. 
Table 4: TGARCH (1,1) Regression Results for the EUA Price Drivers 
Variable EUAt 
 (1) (2) 
Constant 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
0.0011 
(0.0008) 
Brentt      0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 
 
 
Coalt     -0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
 
Gast      0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Switcht       0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
MomentumEUAt      0.0082*** 
(0.0007) 
     0.0083*** 
(0.0007) 
NAP phase IIt -0.0084* 
(0.0044) 
-0.0095* 
(0.0049) 
Adjusted R2 0.1916 0.1631 
Log-Likelihood 1287.749 1274.906 
ARCH LM Test 0.7950 0.6360 
Q(20) Statistic 26.789 24.322 
AIC -4.7811 -4.8243 
SC -4.9667 -4.7673 
N 529 529 
Note: EUAt refers to the residuals of the VAR(4) model related to the EUA (ECX EUA Phase II Futures). 
***,(**),(*) Denotes 1%,(5%),(10%) significance levels. The quality of regressions is verified through the following 
diagnostic tests: the adjusted R-squared (Adjusted-R2), the Log-Likelihood, the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH 
LM Test), the Ljung Box Q-test statistic with a maximum number of lags of 20 (Q(20) statistic), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The 1% (5%) critical value for the Ljung-Box 
portmanteau test for serial correlation in the squared residuals with 20 lags is 37.57 (31.41). N is the number of 
observations. 
In regression (1), we observe that energy variables have an impact on the EUA variable 
at statistically significant levels, which is conform to previous literature (Mansanet-Bataller 
et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008)).21 Brent and gas have a positive impact on EUA price 
changes: increases in fuel prices are directly transmitted to the CO2 allowance market. As 
the most CO2-intensive fuel, coal has a negative impact on CO2 prices. This implies that 
when the coal price increases, industrials have an incentive to use less CO2-intensive fuels, 
which decreases the demand and the price of CO2 allowances. In regression (2), we uncover 
the influence of two other variables: momentumEUA is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, while the dummy variable NAP Phase II is negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The sign of the latter variable is conform to our expectations: 
                                                   
20 This table is not reproduced here to conserve space, and may be obtained upon request. 
21 Note that the energy variables are considered here as contemporaneous variables. Including lags did not 
fundamentally change the results obtained. 
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NAPs II allocations were reduced by 10% compared to NAPs I. This stricter constraint did 
not impact positively EUAs due to the context of the economic crisis, which was reflected 
primarily in the decrease of production outputs (and as consequence in reduced CO2 
emissions from EU ETS installations). The positive sign of momentumEUA may be explained 
by the fact that EUA price changes responded positively to carbon market trends during our 
study period. 
In regression (2), we uncover the explanatory power of the switch variable at the 1% 
level. Its positive sign confirms that when the coal price increases, it becomes more 
profitable for power operators to switch from coal to natural gas including CO2 costs. Both 
the momentumEUA and NAP Phase II variables are also significant with similar coefficients 
and signs as in regression (1), which confirms the robustness of our previous estimates. 
Having reviewed the main price drivers of the EUA variable, we extend in the next section 
our investigation to the fundamentals of sCERs.  
5.   sCER Price Drivers 
We focus in this section on the modeling of the sCER variable defined as the residuals 
of the VAR(4) model for the sCERs.22 To our best knowledge, this constitutes the first 
empirical analysis of sCER price drivers.  
5.1.  Exogenous variables 
As for EUAs, it is important to distinguish between demand and supply factors 
affecting sCERs. Contrary to the allocation of EUA, the supply of sCERs is unknown. The 
main sources of uncertainty are due to the fact that (i) the supply of primary CERs is 
unknown and difficult to estimate (as it depends on several risks related to the issuance of 
primary CERs); and (ii) the amount of primary CERs that will be converted into sCERs is 
also difficult to assess (see Trotignon and Leguet (2009). On the demand side, whereas on 
the EU ETS the demand comes from private financial or industrial operators, for sCERs the 
demand comes from a larger number of participants (investors, industrials and Annex-B 
countries). Most of the CERs demand to date comes from European industrials, which are 
limited to 13.4% (on average) of surrendered allowances for compliance during Phase II of 
the EU ETS. Besides, Annex-B countries of the Kyoto Protocol may also use CERs for 
compliance. Countries with a potential deficit of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs valid 
under the Kyoto Protocol) in 2012 - such as Japan - are involved in sCERs purchasing. 
Among other factors that may impact sCERs prices, we identify the same factors as those 
affecting EUAs prices, since both assets may be used for compliance in the EU ETS. 
                                                   
22 Note that as the drivers of primary and secondary CER are not the same, it is important to remind here that 
we are considering secondary CER prices. 
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Hence, we consider the same explanatory variables as for EUAs in sCERs pricing. That is, 
energy prices (brent, gas and coal), the switch price variable, temperatures variables, 
variables related to production levels, market volatility, and dummy variables related to the 
announcements concerning the status of the CDM in Phase III of the EU ETS and the ITL-
CITL connection. Note that we have computed a new specific variable, called 
momentumsCER, for the indication of bullish and bearish periods. Similarly to the case of the 
momentumEUA variable, the momentumsCER variable is obtained as the difference between 
the sCER variable at time t and at time t-5.  
Besides, we add three variables that take into account the specificities of sCERs (mostly 
related to the supply side): (i) CDM EB meeting, (ii) linking, and (iii) CDMpipeline. 
The dummy variable CDM EB meeting is equal to 1 on the publication date of CDM 
EB’s reports, and 0 otherwise. This variable indicates the arrival of new information from 
the United Nations’CDM Executive Board. The dummy variable linking is equal to 1 when 
there on the announcement date related to the linking of emissions trading schemes 
worldwide, and 0 otherwise.23 
Finally, the CDMpipeline variable is the forecast error concerning the number of 
primary CERs actually delivered by the CDM EB. Each month, the UNEP Risoe announces 
how many primary CERs are expected to be delivered in the CDM Pipeline.24 This variable 
is computed following the approach developed by Kilian and Vega (2008):  
σˆ
tt
t
ExpectedlisedReaeCDMpipelin −=  
With Realisedt the announced value of the amount of primary CERs delivered by the 
UNEP Risoe, Expectedt the market’s expectation of the amount of primary CERs to be 
delivered prior to the announcement, calculated by Trotignon and Leguet (2009), and 
σˆ the sample standard deviation of the “unexpected” component. Figure 10 shows the 
forecast errors for the number of primary CERs available in the CDM pipeline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
23 Please see Annex I for detailed information on both data.  
24 Available at : http://cdmpipeline.org 
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Figure 10: Forecast errors for the number of CERs available in the CDM Pipeline 
from May 2008 to March 2009 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe and Mission Climat Caisse des Dépôts 
5.2.  GARCH modeling 
We model sCER prices by following the same methodology as for EUA Phase II 
Futures prices: 
tlinking
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with sCERt are the residuals of the VAR(4) model related to the sCERs at time t, 
momentumsCERt, CDMpipelinet, CDMEBmeetingt, and linkingt exogenous variables specific 
to sCERs defined as above. Other variables have been defined previously for the EUA 
variable. 
5.3.  Estimation results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 5. The quality of the regressions (3) to (5) is 
verified with the same diagnostic tests as for EUAs. All diagnostic tests are validated for 
regressions (3) to (5).  
In regression (3), we observe that energy prices (brent, coal lagged one period, and gas) 
have a statistically significant impact on sCER prices with the same signs as for EUAs. 
This first result confirms that EUAs and sCERs share basically the same price fundamentals 
with respect to the interaction with energy markets.  
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In regression (4), momentumsCERt and linking are statistically significant at the 1% and 
10% levels, respectively. The sign and interpretation of momentumsCERt is similar to 
momentumEUAt in the case of the EUA variable. 
The positive sign of linking suggests that news about the future connection between the 
European and international credits carbon markets tend to increase sCERs prices. Note that 
sCERs are fungible across regional and domestic markets. Thus, this positive sign is 
coherent with what we would expect: as the global demand of sCERs increases, the price of 
sCERs also increases.  
In regression (5), we note that CDMpipeline is not significant in explaining sCERs 
price changes. This result is conforming to the view that sCERs have distinct fundamentals 
from the delivery of primary CERs, since they are free of project delivery risk.  
Table 5: TGARCH (1,1) Regression Results for the sCER Price Drivers 
Variable sCERt 
 (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.0008 
(0.007) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
0.0007 
(0.0013) 
brentt       0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
  0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
coalt-1     0.0008** 
(0.0001) 
      -0.0017*** 
(0.0003) 
gast        0.0002*** 
(0.0001) 
 0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
momentumCERt      0.0093** 
(0.0009) 
      0.0098*** 
(0.0009) 
 
Linkingt  0.0194* 
(0.0111) 
 
CDM pipelinet   0.0005 
(0.0013) 
Adjusted R2 0.1582 0.1427 0.0469 
Log-Likelihood 1344.581 1339.208 660.743 
ARCH LM Test 0.9195 0.9730 0.7560 
Q(20) Statistic 25.137 24.396 20.724 
AIC -5.1074 -4.8026 -4.5827 
SC -5.0341 -4.7783 -4.4542 
N 529 529 529 
Note: sCERt refers to the residuals of the VAR(4) model related to sCERs (Reuters sCER Price Index). 
***,(**),(*) Denotes 1%,(5%),(10%) significance levels. The quality of regressions is verified through the following 
diagnostic tests: the adjusted R-squared (Adjusted-R2), the Log-Likelihood, the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH 
LM Test), the Ljung Box Q-test statistic with a maximum number of lags of 20 (Q(20) statistic), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The 1% (5%) critical value for the Ljung-Box 
portmanteau test for serial correlation in the squared residuals with 20 lags is 37.57 (31.41). N is the number of 
observations. 
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Having detailed separately EUAs and sCERs price drivers, we now turn to the 
determinants of the price difference between these two emissions assets. 
6.   EUA-sCER Spread drivers 
Following the analysis of EUAs and sCER price drivers, we focus in this section on the 
variables that may have an explanatory power for the evolution of the EUA-sCER spread 
defined as follows: 
ttt sCEREUASpread −=  
With EUAt and sCERt respectively, the EUA (ECX EUA Phase II Futures prices) and 
sCER (Reuters sCER Price Index) rolled-over futures contract prices.25 The EUA-sCER 
spread is pictured at the bottom of Figure 1. Given its construction, the spread is positive. It 
is equal to €2 in March 2007, €8 in May 2007, and evolves in the range of €2 to €6 until 
May 2008. It becomes then relatively close to zero until March 2009. Thus, the spread 
seems to widen (narrow) depending on bullish (bearish) periods on emissions markets. In 
Figure 11, we observe that the EUA-sCER spread taken in stationary first-difference 
transformation exhibits volatility clustering from May to September 2008, and that the 
volatility decreases near the end of the sample period. 
Figure 11: First-difference of the EUA-sCER Spread from March 9, 2007 to 
March 31, 2009 
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25 Note that ECX has implemented a sCER-EUA trading facility that allows trading the spread at reduced 
transaction costs. To facilitate the understanding of the determinants of the spread, we have chosen the 
more intuitive definition of the Spread = EUA-sCER, which has the advantage to be positive over the 
sample period. 
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The EUA-sCERs spread trading is mostly used by industrial and financial operators 
involved in short term trading activity. Indeed, the supply and demand for EUA-sCERs 
spread contracts come from short term price differences between EUAs and sCERs (as 
shown in Figure1). At time t, it appears profitable for investors to swap between these two 
carbon assets by buying sCERs and selling EUAs, since both assets may be used for 
compliance in the EU ETS (as long as the import limit on CERs is not reached). However, 
not all market participants may benefit from this arbitrage strategy. The reason for that 
situation is twofold: (i) there exist different types of market participants with different kinds 
of obligations and flexibility requirements on the use of sCERs, and (ii) technical skills are 
required to simultaneously buy sCERs and sell EUAs. 
The latter point means that while banks may trade EUAs and sCERs on the market, 
they cannot use them towards their own compliance (and thus benefit from the full scale of 
the arbitrage strategy), since they are not regulated by the scheme. Conversely, large 
regulated utilities such as energy trading companies may benefit from opening a carbon 
trading desk in-house and exchange sCERs for EUAs in their own registry account. This 
type of market participant is therefore able to arbitrate between the two emissions markets 
by buying sCERs on the market and selling EUAs (registering them in its own registry 
towards compliance with their emissions target) when the price difference between the two 
emissions markets is at its maximum. This strategy yields a net “free-lunch” benefit as long 
as the import limit on CERs is not reached (which is not likely to be reached anytime soon 
according to the analysis by Trotignon and Leguet (2009)). 
6.1.  Exogenous variables 
Besides the variables that have been previously identified as impacting EUAs and 
sCERs, we use price thresholds, market activity and liquidity variables stemming from the 
market microstructure literature (Codogno et al. (2003), Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009)) 
that may have an explanatory power for the EUA-sCER spread.  
Regarding price thresholds, EUApricelevel is computed by regressing the EUA-sCER 
spread against the time-series of EUA prices. This variable reflects the idea that investors 
would more easily trade the spread if EUAs prices are around €30 than if they drop to €5. 
Following Zhang (2002), we also use a threshold variable (noted thresholdSpread) defined 
at €6 for the EUA-sCER spread.26 Above this threshold, investors are expected to 
simultaneously sell EUAs and buy sCERs. Below, they are expected to wait for the 
widening of the spread to benefit from future more profitable arbitrage opportunities. Note 
                                                   
26 This threshold has been fixed considering the average level of the spread during our sample period. 
Besides, we experimented with various thresholds, and this variable was found to be statistically 
significant only as such. 
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that this behavior is coherent with the fact that the import of CERs in the EU ETS (and thus 
the arbitrage opportunity) is limited in quantity and through time.  
Regarding market activity, we use the average trade size for ECX EUA Phase II Futures 
prices (averagetradeEUA), defined as the daily volume divided by the daily number of 
trades, in order to track the impact of block trades or quasi-block trades on the spread. One 
could expect that large primary CER issuance could translate into large movements in the 
EUA market for cashing on the spread. Additionally, we have defined the variable 
openintEUA as the level of the open interest for the prevailing EUA calendar futures 
contract. This variable reflects the market overall level of engagement with the underlying 
asset. Compared to cumulative volumes, the open interest measure has the advantage to 
neutralize the impact of further transactions on existing futures positions to other market 
participants. The larger the open interest, the larger the quantity of futures contracts to be 
settled at a given date. We have also created the variable CDMmktdvlpt as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 during news announcements regarding the ability to trade sCERs (such 
as the beginning of trading sCER throughout standardized contracts on market places, etc.) 
and 0 otherwise.27 We expect more activity on the spread as more announcements are 
recorded. Moreover, numbertradeEUA indicates the daily number of trades performed on 
ECX EUA Phase II future prices, as a proxy for liquidity in the market. This variable also 
reflects market participants’ increased technical skills, as they may resort to specific 
algorithms to “slice up” large orders. Figure 12 displays the openintEUA, 
numbertradeEUA, and averagetradeEUA variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
27 See Annex I for announcement dates regarding the ability to trade sCERs.  
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Figure 12: ECX EUA Futures Open Interest (left), BNX Daily Number of Trades 
(right), and Average value of Orders (below) from March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
  
 
 Source: ECX and Bluenext 
To detect whether the size of the EUA-sCER spread is affected by changes in market 
activity and more specifically by market liquidity, we have considered trade-based 
measures for EUAs and sCERs. More precisely, following Gómez-Puig (2006), we have 
instrumented the ΔvolumeEUA variable, which tracks changes in the volume of EUAs 
traded, and the ΔvolumesCER variable, which tracks changes in sCERs volumes 
exchanged.28 Figure 13 shows the evolution of these two variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
28 Data from the London Energy Brokers’Association (LEBA) have been used to compute this variable.  
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Figure 13: ECX EUA Futures (left) and Reuters CER Index (right) Volumes from  
March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
 
Source: ECX and LEBA 
By using the (intraday) order book for EUAs, we computed relative bid-ask measures 
for EUAs (bidaskEUA). We systematically checked relative bid-ask spreads over 10% and 
below 1% (i.e. out of the established trend), and manually removed outliers that most likely 
reflected market orders made without any chance of being fulfilled.29 Hence, the “cleaned” 
bid-ask used is a proxy for real liquidity of EUAs. We applied the same methodology with 
brokers’ bid-ask data from the Reuters CER index (bidasksCER). The index contains daily 
average bid and ask prices from eight representative carbon brokers, so that no 
recalculation was required to proxy market liquidity on a daily basis. Figure 14 shows the 
bidaskEUA and bidasksCER variables. 
Figure 14: Bid-ask spread for ECX EUA Futures (left) and Reuters CER Index 
(right) from March 9, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
Source: ECX and Reuters 
                                                   
29  Bid-ask spreads may be negative according to our calculations since: (1) we are interested in daily average 
bid and ask, hence smoothing any intraday move; and (2) some bids or asks could have been posted with 
no intent of being attractive, but rather by contractual obligations (for market makers), or to deceive. 
Those bids and asks distort our estimation of bid-ask spreads. There is no economic rationale behind a 
negative bid-ask for a single quote, but it could indicate strong intraday activity. 
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Finally, we use Panic as a dummy variable equal to 1 from October 10 to 17, 2008; 
and 0 otherwise. This variable reflects the sharp increase in the volatility of EUA prices that 
may be observed in October 2008, as regulated utilities were “rushing to cash” in search for 
liquidity, in order to cope with the credit crunch crisis according to market observers.30 
6.2.  GARCH modeling 
We model the EUA-sCER spread by following the same methodology as for the 
determinants of EUA and sCER variables: 
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with Spreadt the first-differenced EUA-sCER spread, CDMmktdvlptt, 
numbertradeEUAt, openintEUAt, EUApricelevelt, averagetradeEUAt, volumeEUAt, 
volumesCERt, bidaskEUAt, bidasksCERt, thresholdSpreadt are the exogenous variables 
specific to the EUA-sCER spread commented above. Other variables have been defined 
previously for the analysis of EUA and sCER price drivers. Exogenous variables have been 
transformed to stationary when needed. 
6.3.  Estimation results 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the EUA-sCER spread. All diagnostic tests 
are validated for regressions (6) and (7).  
Note that a statistically significant positive (negative) coefficient means that the spread 
is widening (narrowing) following changes in the underlying explanatory variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
30 See editorial by Trevor Sikorski (Barclays Capital) in issue #35 of the Tendances Carbone newsletter, 
Mission Climat Caisse des Dépôts, Paris.  
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Table 6: TGARCH(1,1) Regression Results for the EUA-sCER Spread Drivers 
Variable Spreadt 
(6) 
Spreadt 
(7) 
Constant 0.0145 
(0.0111) 
-0.0080 
(0.0134) 
EUA price levelt -0.9562*** 
(0.0322) 
-0.6726*** 
(0.0469) 
Δ volume EUAt 0.0007** 
(0.0004) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
Δ volume sCERt 0.0013** 
(0.0007) 
 
MomentumEUAt -0.0945*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.0997*** 
(0.0151) 
Linkingt 0.2610*** 
(0.0733) 
 
VIXt  0.3364*** 
(0.1213) 
Crisist  -0.4299*** 
(0.0711) 
CDM EB meetingt  -0.0901*** 
(0.0541) 
ThresholdSpreadt  0.0764*** 
(0.0134) 
CDM pipelinet  -0.0161*** 
(0.0013) 
Open interest EUAt  0.0001*** 
(0.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.5800 0.5658 
Log-Likelihood 141.5910 79.0179 
ARCH LM Test 0.5540 0.5278 
Q(20) statistic 36.765 26.371 
AIC -0.5023 -0.4699 
SC -0.4209 -0.3016 
N 529 529 
Note: Spreadt = EUAt-sCERt. EUA refers to ECX EUA Phase II Futures prices. sCERt refers to Reuters sCER 
Price Index. ***,(**),(*) Denotes 1%,(5%),(10%) significance levels. The quality of regressions is verified through 
the following diagnostic tests: the adjusted R-squared (Adjusted-R2), the Log-Likelihood, the ARCH Lagrange 
Multiplier (ARCH LM Test), the Ljung Box Q-test statistic with a maximum number of lags of 20 (Q(20) statistic), the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz Criterion (SC). The 1% (5%) critical value for the Ljung-Box 
portmanteau test for serial correlation in the squared residuals with 20 lags is 37.57 (31.41). N is the number of 
observations. 
In regression (6) we observe that the EUApricelevelt variable has a strong and 
statistically significant explanatory power for the determination of the EUA-sCER spread. 
As highlighted previously, sCER and EUA prices have followed similar price paths over 
the period. Thus, changes in EUA prices have a strong effect on the EUA-sCER spread. 
The sign of the EUApricelevelt coefficient is negative, which suggests that when EUA 
prices increase, the EUA-sCER spread diminishes. This result supports the intuition that at 
higher EUA price levels, investors and market operators have higher incentives to take 
adequate positions in both emissions markets to take advantage of the EUA-sCER spread. 
On the contrary, at low levels of EUA prices, the EUA-sCER is narrowing, which yields 
less profitable arbitrage opportunities. Interestingly, the coefficients of the ΔvoumelEUAt 
and ΔvoumelsCERt variables are statistically significant and positive. This result indicates 
that increased trading of EUAs and sCERs translates into wider EUA-sCER spread. This 
view is conform to the use of the EUA-sCER spread as a speculative product by rational 
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investors and arbitrageurs: the volumes exchanged for EUAs and sCERs are found to be the 
highest when the EUA-sCER spread is at its maximum – thereby reflecting the strategy to 
maximize net profits. 
The momentumEUAt and linkingt variables have a statistically significant impact on 
variation of the EUA-sCER spread. The sign of momentumEUAt is positive, which suggests 
that when this variable is increasing (on a bullish carbon market), the EUA-sCER spread is 
narrowing. This result illustrates in a similar way the profit-maximizing strategy of rational 
market participants in the carbon market through the use of the EUA-sCER spread. 
Conversely, on a bearish carbon market (indicated by decreases in the momentumEUAt 
variable), the EUA-sCER spread is widening, which provides future opportunities for 
market participants to make the spread transaction at better conditions.  
As indicated by the positive coefficient of the linking variable at the 1% level, the 
development of an international carbon market accepting sCERs as compliance assets tends 
to widen the EUA-sCER spread. Indeed, the prospects for growing sCERs demand outside 
of the European trading system might lead to a partial decorrelation from EUAs in a near 
future.  
News regarding Phase III of the EU ETS, the ITL-CITL connection and market 
liquidity (as proxied by bid-ask spreads) could not be identified as statistically significant 
variables in regression (6).  
Regression (7) is similar to regression (6), and reveals the explanatory power of six 
additional variables. The EUApricelevelt, the ΔvolumesEUAt, and the momentumEUAt, 
coefficients may be interpreted identically. Changes in the VIX index, which are obtained 
from the implied volatility of S&P option prices, are used as a proxy of the evolution of 
aggregate financial markets’ volatility. Its positive and statistically significant coefficient 
indicates that the EUA-sCER spread widens when the stock market volatility increases. 
This increase in the spread may indicate that the risk of holding sCER is perceived as 
higher than holding EUAs, which translates into a higher risk premium for the sCERs.  
The crisis dummy variable appears statistically significant with a negative coefficient. 
Since the start of the global financial crisis, the EUA-sCER spread has narrowed, which 
suggests a strong interest in selling EUAs. Two facts may help to understand this negative 
coefficient. First, the global financial downturn has caused a decrease in industrial 
production and energy demand (and thus in the energy production of CO2-intensive plants). 
The need for CO2 allowances has dropped drastically, which fostered incentives to sell 
EUAs and contributed to the decline of the EUA-sCER spread. Second, as a consequence 
of the crisis, funding needs have increased. From this perspective, selling EUAs (which are 
only needed for compliance on April 30th of the year N+1) constitutes a sound strategy in 
order to obtain the cash needed from companies, especially in a credit-constrained 
economic environment. Thus, massive sales of EUAs for this purpose may explain the 
narrowing of the spread. 
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The coefficient of the dummy variable ThresholdSpreadt, is statistically significant and 
positive. Thus, when the EUA-sCER spread goes beyond the €6 level, the spread is 
widening more. This result confirms that market participants wait for the €6 threshold of 
the EUA-sCER spread to be achieved before taking advantage of the arbitrage strategy, 
thereby maximizing net profits from this free-lunch activity.  
The coefficients of the two variables CDMpipelinet and CDMEBmeeting are negative 
and statistically significant. Positive (negative) expected amount of primary CERs issued 
and news about CDM EB meetings are associated with a narrowing (widening) of the 
EUA-sCER spread. Increasing the delivery of CERs reduces the counterparty risk of a 
secondary CER, since the supply of primary CER is rising. Thus, the premium for holding 
EUAs instead of sCER decreases, which further narrows the spread. 
Finally, the openintEUAt variable may be interpreted similarly to the results relative to 
changes in carbon assets’ volumes. As for the ΔvolumeEUAt and ΔvolumesCERt variables, 
increases in the open interest position on EUA futures is translated into a wider EUA-sCER 
spread. 
Taken together, these results contribute to the clear identification of three categories of 
drivers for the EUA-sCER spread. First, the spread reacts to the EUA price levels as the 
EU ETS remains to date the major source of CER demand (both primary and secondary). 
Second, the spread is explained by variables reflecting the use of sCERs as a flexibility 
mechanism for EU ETS compliance buyers. This may be proxied by looking at (1) 
emissions prospects (i.e. demand for compliance) and the compliance profile of buyers (i.e. 
their ability to surrender a given quantity of CERs for compliance) and (2) the relative 
supply of EUAs (based on the levels of NAPs) and CERs (from the CDM pipeline) which 
will end up being used in the EU ETS. Third, and most importantly, we uncover that the 
EUA-sCER spread may be explained by market microstructure variables (e.g. trading 
activity proxies) justifying the “speculation”-related nature of this instrument. This result 
constitutes our central contribution with regard to the identification of the EUA-sCER 
spread drivers, since it appeared obvious to most market observers that this trading facility 
was used for speculative purposes, yielding net profit free-of-risk (that may be truly called a 
‘free-lunch’ activity for arbitrageurs). Thus, we provide the first formal empirical analysis 
of such rational behavior of investors in the context of the EU ETS Phase II. 
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7.   Conclusion 
This article provides the first complete empirical analysis of both EUAs and sCERs 
price drivers, as well as the determinants of the EUA-sCER spread during Phase II (2008-
2012) of the EU ETS. To our best knowledge, no previous empirical study has focused 
either on the determination of sCERs drivers or on the arbitrage strategies consisting in 
buying sCERs and selling EUAs (yielding net profits from the existence of a positive EUA-
sCER spread during the sample period). We may decompose our findings in three main 
contributions. 
First, the fundamentals of EUAs during Phase II have been clearly identified. As the 
supply of allowances was fixed by allocations through negotiations between the European 
Commission and Member States, price uncertainties typically depend on the level of 
demand factors. Conform to previous literature, we find that the demand for Phase II EUA 
prices also depends, in the short term, on the level of CO2 emissions. The EUA variable 
classically evolves during the sample period as a function of primary energy prices and 
news related to Phase II NAPs. However, economic growth and weather conditions were 
not identified as significant influences, contrary to what has been observed during Phase I. 
Second, our analysis of sCERs (i.e. CERs already issued by the CDM Executive Board 
of the United Nations) has confirmed that EUAs determine significantly the sCERs price 
path. We show that there exists one long-term cointegrating vector between EUAs and 
sCERs taken in natural logarithm transformation. Besides, the sCER variable has a stronger 
tendency to adjust to past disequilibria by moving towards the trend values of the EUA 
variable, which confirmed that EUAs are the leading factor in the price formation of 
sCERs. This result emphasizes that EUAs remain the most widely recognized “money” on 
emissions market. EUAs are exchanged broadly as the most liquid asset for carbon trading, 
which may be explained by the fact that Europe remains to date the major source of 
demand for that kind of credits. We also find that energy prices, variables referring to the 
linking of international carbon markets, and momentumsCER variables have an impact on 
sCERs prices. We conclude that sCERs pricing differs from EUAs since it embodies a 
greater level of uncertainty. Market participants are lacking the exact information 
concerning either the supply of CERs, or the total expected demand by 2012. Indeed, the 
future of credit offset mechanisms beyond 2012 is currently in definition with the current 
international negotiations for an international climate framework successor of the Kyoto 
protocol and with the current expectation on the regional carbon markets development, 
while the use of CERs in Europe is confirmed only until 2020.  
Our third and main contribution concerns the determinants of the observed difference 
between EUA and sCER prices, namely the EUA-sCER spread. We identify statistically the 
influence of three key factors: (i) the evolution of EUA price levels, (ii) the regulatory 
information concerning both sCERs and EUAs, and (iii) trading activity proxies. Hence, we 
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confirm the view that the EUA-sCER spread may be used as a ‘speculative’ instrument by 
rational investors and market participants on the EU ETS, who are able to trade 
simultaneously EUAs and sCERs when the price difference is large enough to justify the 
arbitrage activity. When ‘free-lunch’ opportunities exist on financial markets, they should 
be instantly identified by market agents.  
The existence of the EUA-sCER spread may thus be chiefly explained by the 
conjunction of three factors: (i) the demand and supply of the EUA and sCER are different 
with higher uncertainty related to the sCERs, (ii) the European Commission has set an 
import limit of 13.4% on average concerning the use of CERs towards compliance within 
the European emissions trading system  and (iii) the EUA and sCERs are not perfectively 
fungible for all market participants but only for those with compliance obligations. This 
limits the exploitation of the arbitrage opportunities that, in high volumes reduce the spread. 
Consequently, the arbitrage opportunities of exchanging cheaper sCERs by EUAs for 
compliance are limited in quantity and through time and benefit mainly to energy trading 
companies which possess large supplies of EUAs and their own carbon trading desk. In this 
paper, we uncover a salient characteristic of these newly created emissions markets: they 
allow the existence of temporary free-lunch activities (i.e. arbitrage opportunities are not 
necessarily transformed once they are identified, which is contrary to fundamental theories 
of finance), and foster the adoption of arbitrage operations (i.e. purchasing the EUA-sCER 
spread and thereby making a net risk-free profit) once the EUA-sCER spread has reached a 
given threshold. This empirical analysis of emissions markets reveals in fine the rational 
behavior of investors: profit-maximizing strategies are elaborated given the very unusual – 
compared to other financial markets – institutional characteristics of emissions markets. 
The arbitrage activity between EUA and sCERs also requires an expert knowledge that only 
banks with carbon trading desks, major energy trading companies, and specialized brokers 
are able to offer as of today. As the range of carbon markets develops worldwide, we may 
expect this kind of trading activities to develop rapidly, as the trading of spread for crude 
oil futures has recently demonstrated. 
The evolution of the spread will depend crucially on sCER supply and its European 
demand, which will be defined gradually until the end of Phase II. Two scenarios are 
possible. If the supply of CERs is less than 1,400 Mt (including both primary and 
secondary), the price of sCER should rise towards that of the EUAs, and the spread should 
shrink. Conversely, if the supply of CERs is more than 1,400 Mt, the price of sCERs will 
disconnect from that of the EUAs.  
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Annex 1: Dummy variables  
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The dummy variables refer to new information disclosure concerning NAPs Phase II (NAPs Phase II), the 
development of the EU ETS during Phase III (EU ETS Phase III), the day of publication of the CDM Executive Board 
report (CDM EB meeting), the CER market development (CDM mktdvlpt), the linking of emission trading schemes 
worldwide (linking) and the ITL-CITL connection (ITL-CITL). Sources: UNFCCC, European Commission, European 
Council, European Parliament, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, Nordpool, ECX, 
EEX, Bluenext, ICE, Point Carbon, CNN. 
